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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
Introduction to the Problem
This paper has not attempted to make any contribution 
to the legal profession; it is rather an attempt on the part 
of a layman to present in so far as is possible, without in­
dulging in dangerous interpretation, a general background of 
the problem of school liability for injuries to pupils in 
the State of Montana,
If the law were a static and unchangeable institution 
there would perhaps be no need of lay people wading through 
much extraneous information in an attempt to evaluate their 
respective relationships in a legal situation, and the entire 
problem of tort liability in a particular state might be 
summed up comparatively briefly.
The law, however, is in a constant state of flux.
New laws are passed by legislatures; new interpretations are 
rendered by the courts; and opinions by prominent jurists, 
lawyers, and attorney generals frequently influence legis­
lators and other attorneys. Therefore, this paper will be 
limited to that information which may be of interest and
—  1 —
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importance to school people, not with the view that they may, 
in the event of a lawsuit against them, be prompted to act as 
their own counsel, but rather with the thought in mind that 
with some background regarding their legal obligations they 
may be better prepared to avoid situations which may render 
them liable to a suit for damages.
In 1950, over twelve thousand cases, which were 
brought against schools, cost an aggregate sum of approxi­
mately seven million dollars^. This figure alone should be 
significant evidence to school board members, administrators 
and teachers that the problem is real, that it affects 
school finances, and as will be discussed later, it has its 
implications for school policy.
The problem is not only important to school people, 
but has presented situations troublesome to the courts and 
taxpayers alike. Perhaps the main issue involved can be 
classified as a moral one. For example, to what extent 
should boards of education be responsible for pupils, maimed, 
injured or killed? As the situation stands at the present 
time, it is frequently the only body capable financially 
of compensating parents or pupils for any loss. There is an 
old adage that you cannot squeeze blood from a stone. Is it 
then feasible to bring suit against a school teacher whose 
income makes the satisfaction of any judgment an impossibil­
ity? Certainly this has been true in the past. There is no
^Robert Hamilton, ^̂ Law for Schoolmen”, Time Magazine, 
(May 21, 1951). ------ ^-----
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way of ascertaining how many potential suits against teachers 
for negligence have never reached the courts, because of the 
futility of suing someone who does not have the money. On 
the other hand, if for the sake of discussion, school boards 
were stripped of their immunity and held liable as a body for 
the negligence of teachers, and administrators, two questions 
are left to be answered. First of all, would there be an un­
duly large number of suits brought against the public schools 
merely because public funds would be available to satisfy a 
judgment? Secondly, would such an imposed liability affect 
the quality and caliber of men seeking positions as trustees? 
In most states, a local board member's job is an honorary one, 
and does not carry with it any financial compensation in the 
form of salary or expenses. Would it then be just to hold 
members of a community financially liable when engaged in a 
service to a community for which they receive no financial 
benefit? At the same time, who is to say that a child or its 
parents should not be compensated for the loss of sight of a
child, a permanent injury, or even a medical bill for a
temporary injury if that injury was in any way the result of 
unreasonable conduct on the part of schools or school per­
sonnel?
With the schools of our nation, and Montana no excep­
tion, being responsible for an increasing number of pupils, 
with new educational plants and policies underway, schools 
have in effect become "big business". As big business, they
not only enjoy the responsibility, but must share the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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obligations, not because of the financial magnitude of edu­
cational institutions alone but more so because of the in­
creasing scope of educational activities.
Definitions of Legal Terras
To understand the problem and its implications, it 
is necessary and to a great extent appropriate to confine 
research to professional and legal sources. In doing so, the 
layman finds himself confronted with a vocabulary and termi­
nology peculiar to the legal profession but needful of defi­
nition to those whose work in other fields rarely if ever 
brings them in contact with these terms.
First of all, what is meant by the term tort? A 
tort according to Prosser^ is:
. . . .  a term applied to a miscellaneous and 
more or less unconnected group of civil wrongs, 
other than breach of contract, for which a 
court of laIV will afford a remedy in the form 
of an action for damages. The law of torts is 
concerned with the compensation of losses 
suffered by private individuals in their 
legally protected interests through conduct of 
others which is regarded as socially unreason­
able.
Many definitions of the term tort can be supplied,
for example, a tort may be defined as:
. . . .  a legal wrong committed upon the person 
or property independent of contract.2 or
^William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts, 
(West Publishing Co., 1941).
2Blackls Law Dictionary (3rd ed.; West Publishing Co.,
1933).
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. . . .  the infraction of some public duty, bv 
which special damage accrues to the individual.
The same authority cited above has also defined a
tort as:
, . . . the violation of some private obligation 
by which like damage accrues to the individual.2
This study has been concerned with a particular kind
of tort, that which involved an injury to the person, and
might be properlv classified as being a personal tort as
distinguished from one involving damage to real or personal
property.3
If a tort then can be committed through the conduct
of others, which is regarded as socially unreasonable, the
next logical question would be what constitutes socially
unreasonable conduct, how is it so defined in legal terms?
The most common form of conduct which courts and
legislators have generally recognized and defined as being
socially unreasonable is negligence. Negligence has been
defined by the Montana courts, among many others as:
. . . .  the want of care which an ordinary 
prudent and careful man would exercise under 
given circumstances.4
According to Prosser^, certain elements are necessary
^Black, o£. cit., I, 4.
^Ibid., p. 4.
^Ibid.. p. 4.
^Birsch v. Citizens Electric Col, 36 Mont. 574, 93 fac. 940 (1903).
^Prosser, o£, cit., I, 4.
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to render one liable on the basis of negligence. They are;
A. A legal duty to conform to a standard
of conduct for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risks.
B . A failure to conform to the standard.
C. A reasonably close causal connection be­
tween the conduct and the resulting injury.
D. Actual loss or damage resulting to the
interests of another.
Another term which is frequently encountered in law­
suits involving negligence is contributory negligence. 
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the person 
suffering damages which falls below the standard to which he 
is required to conform for his own protection. Such conduct 
will bar recovery only if it has exposed the damaged party
to the particular risk from which he suffers harm.^ Contrib­
utory negligence therefore, may prevent recovery against a 
negligent party.
Another bar to recovery is stated in legal terras as 
the assumption of risk. which is the implied or express 
consent on the part of the damaged party to relieve the de­
fendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take
2his chances of harm from a particular risk.
Generally speaking, there are four classifications 
of damages which a court may award for the injury or death 
of minors due to negligence:
^Prosser, 0£. cit.. I, 4 , 
^Ibid., p. 4.
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A. A court may award nominal damages.
Nominal damages generally amount to a small 
sum where there is no substantial loss or 
injury, but the law recognizes there has 
been a technical invasion of the plaintiff’s 
right or a breach of defendant’s duty.l
B. Compensatory damages (this is probably 
the most frequently encountered of damages 
awarded in successful suits for personal in­
jury due to negligence) are such as will re­
imburse the injured party for the injury 
only, and will simply make good or replace 
the loss caused by the wrong or injury.^
C. Exemplary damages are damages awarded over 
and above compensatory damages wherever the 
wrong or injury was committed under circum­
stances of violence, opposition, malice, fraud, 
or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of 
the defendant. These are frequently referred 
to as punitive or punitory damages.3
D. Prospective damages, are compensatory damages 
for that damage which is expected to follow 
from the act or negligence of the defendant. 
Things which must necessarily or most probably 
will result from the injury.^
Sources of Legal Authority
Before undertaking a study of cases in a particular 
legal field such as this, it may be well to reviev/ briefly 
the various sources of legal authority on the state level.
First, the State Constitution supersedes all other 
State laws. The Supreme Court of the State interprets the 
State Constitution whenever the need arises in the form of
^Black, o£. cit., I, 4 .
^Ibid.. p. 4,
^Ibid.. p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 5.
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test cases, and therefore the Supreme Court has a definite 
influence in interpreting the meanings of the constitution 
in its relation to laws passed by the legislature.
The second source may be found in the statutes, or 
laws passed by the state legislature. These in turn and in 
theory supersede court decisions or the common law.
The next level of authority may be found in decisions 
of the various levels of courts in the various states. These 
proceedings when compiled and evaluated have established cer­
tain legal principles and precedents which constitute what is 
known as the common law. (The term common law may be correct­
ly applied in reference to the English common law which has 
a very great influence on our oim courts in the absence of 
American decisions pertinent to the subject.)
A decision in one state having similar statutory 
regulations does not necessarily have to be followed by the 
courts of another state, but it must be remembered that prec­
edent has long been one of the most influential factors in 
legal decisions, and the decisions in one state therefore are 
frequently not without influence on the decisions of another. 
On the other hand, it is possible that a supreme court of a 
state may at a later date reverse its position or revise its 
interpretation of a legal situation. The dicta of cases of 
courts of record may often give clues as to the disposition 
of a particular court which may eventually attempt to remedy 
a situation by reversing a prior decision.
These dicta are not without their influence on legis-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
labors v^o, in agreement with the courts reasoning, may in­
stigate remedial legislation.
In the actual conduct of a trial itself, it becomes 
the duty of a judge to rule on matters of law while a jury 
weighs the evidence to determine questions of fact. It is 
therefore not the jury's duty to determine what negligence 
is, but rather upon instructions from the judge to determine 
from the evidence presented in court whether a situation or 
fact occurred or did not occur.
Summary of the Problem
In summary then, the problem is one of determining 
the areas of possible liability on the part of Montana school 
officials and employees for pupil injury. V/ith an increasing 
number of lawsuits being brought against public schools, and 
with the public schools increasing in size of enrollments and 
in the scope of their activities, this becomes a problem of 
vital importance to school people, whether board members, 
administrators or teachers.
To understand the problem, certain terms have been 
defined which are frequently encountered in the law on this 
subject, the understanding of which is a necessary legal 
background to the problem. In addition to this terminology 
may be added the three larger classifications of legal 
authority within this State, constitutional, statutory, and 
the common law as it is revealed by court decisions. Other
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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legal terms have been used in the body of this work in ad­
dition to those defined here; whenever they have been used 
and it was thought that a definition was needed, it has been 
supplied*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II 
SOURCES OF INFORMTION
In preparing this paper it became apparent that five 
main sources of information were available:
A. Work already done in this field or 
in related fields in other Universities 
in the forms of doctoral dissertations, 
masters' theses or published books;
B. Specific legal references such as 
statutory provisions of the United States, 
court decisions, and legal dictionaries, 
texts and annotated reference books;
C. The opinions of lawyers and school 
administrators ;
D. Facts gathered from parents and pupils 
involved in situations involving injuries 
connected with the school system;
E. Hearsay evidence, regarding cases 
which were never brought to court, or if 
brought to court never reached a court of 
record.
- 11-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 2 -
Doctoral Dissertations
As to the first category, a listing of doctoral 
dissertations^ from the year 1937 to the present time was 
examined.
In 1941, it was found that three such studies were 
made on the doctoral level. The first one was a doctoral 
dissertation by John Cavicchia at Rutgers entitled The Law 
of Tort as Applied to Public Schools . At the same time at 
New York University, Charles Francis Xavier O’Brien wrote on 
The Legal Status of Corporal Punishment in Public School 
Systems of the United States^. (Due to the fact that this 
was only a related problem to the study at hand, and that 
statutory provisions in the State of Montana are rather ex­
plicit as to corporal punishment, O’Brien’s work was not ex­
amined.)
Also, in I94I; Arthur C. Poe at Columbia University 
had published his doctoral dissertation on School Liability 
for Injuries to Pupils4. This work takes the form of a hand-
^Association of Research Libraries, Doctoral Disser- 
tations Accepted by American Universities (H7 W. Wilson Co.,
1941/42-1950/51).
pJohn Cavicchia, "The Law of Tort as Applied to Public 
Schools" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers, 1941).
^Charles Francis Xavier O’Brien, "The Legal Status of 
Corporal Punishment in Public School Systems of the United 
States" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. New York University,
1941).
^Arthur C. Poe, School Liability for Injuries to ?u- 
pils (published Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1941).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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book for school administrators, dealing largely with explan­
ations of the legal principles involved. While Poe points 
out distinctions between states, the information is not di­
rected toward school people in any one particular juris­
diction. His bibliography and listing of cases, while by no 
means exhaustive, makes interesting and informative reading.
In 1940, Harry Nathan Rosenfield published, in coop­
eration with New York University School of Law, a doctoral 
dissertation on the Liability for School Accidents .̂ 
Rosenfield’s work is enhanced, no doubt, by his most appro­
priate background to undertake a writing in this field. He 
was Secretary to the Commissioner, Board of Education, New 
York City, New York, and also an Instructor in School Law, 
School of Education, New York University, and a member of 
the New York Bar.
Rosenfield*8 work is somewhat longer than Poe's but 
more limited in its definition of legal terras. The organiza­
tion of his work becomes extremely valuable to school admin­
istrators by virtue of the fact that he has classified in­
juries to pupils as to their physical location. For example, 
one chapter deals with accidents on the playground, another 
with school safety patrols, another with accidents involved 
in the transportation of students. His work also includes 
an index of cases by states.
^Harry Nathan Rosenfield, Liability for School Acci- 
dents (published Ph.D. dissertation in cooperation 'with New 
York University School of Law, New York University, 1943).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in 1943, Marie Marguerite Schwartz at the University 
of Wisconsin wrote on The Law and the Teacher .̂
In 1943, two more studies on a doctoral level were 
made, one by Herman P. liantell at New York University, con­
cerning The Liability of Teachers and School Officers in New 
2York State . About the same time, at George Peabody College 
for Teachers, Robert Ward Johnston wrote on The Legal Aspects 
of Insuring Public School Property^.
Between 1943 and 194&, there is no evidence of any 
work on the doctoral level being done on this particular 
problem. However, in 1949, at Chicago, Fred E. Brooks did 
some work on The Legal Status of the Pupil in the American 
Public Schools^. At the same time, at Temple University,
Ted J. Satterfield wrote on The Legal Aspects of a Tort 
Liability in School Districts as Indicated by Recent Court 
Decisions^. Satterfield has done subsequent work published
^Marie Marguerite Schwartz, "The Law and the Teacher" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin,
1943).
^Herman P. Mantell, "The Liability of Teachers and 
School Officers in New York State" (unpublished Ph.D. dis­
sertation, New York University, 1943).
^Robert Ward Johnston, "The Legal Aspects of In­
suring Public School Property" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1943).
^Fred E. Brooks, "The Legal Status of the Pupil in 
the American Public Schools" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Chicago, 1949).
^Ted J. Satterfield, "The Legal Aspects of Tort 
Liability in School Districts as Indicated by Recent Court_ 
Decisions" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University,
1949).
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in the Phi Delta Kappan .̂ in which he strongly advocates 
doing away with the iiiiraunity as regards school districts.
At the present time, Satterfield is Professor of Education, 
State Teachers College, Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania,
At Harvard University in 1950, Ernest E. Fuller wrote 
on Tort Liability of School Districts in United States ,̂ 
Another work done in 1950, exclusive of Satterfield’s, was by 
Freeburg at Indiana^,
Probably the most interesting work being currently 
undertaken is a series of pamphlets published by Dean 
Hamilton of the University of Wyoming College of Law, These 
pamphlets^ deal with a great many aspects of school law, and 
are written in a style which is understandable to the layman, 
and particularly interesting because of Hamilton’s willing­
ness to interpret the implications of case holdings to school 
administrators,
Legal Sources
The specific legal references used included as back-
Iphi Delta Kappan (Phi Delta Kappa Fraternity, 1950- 
1951), ^ oY T 3 T :
^Ernest E. Fuller, "Tort Liability of School Districts 
in the United States" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University, 1950).
^William H. Freeburg,"The Law and Liability of 
iMunicipal, Charitable and Private Corporations for Conducting 
Aecreation Camps" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Indiana, 1950).
^R. R. Hamilton, Bi-Weekly School Law Letter, 
(University of Wyoming, College of Law, 1951).
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ground reading pertinent sections of Ruling Case Law^,
Corpus Juris^, Corpus Juris Secondum^, American Law Reports^, 
American Jurisprudence^, Black's Law Dictionary^, and 
Prosser on Torts?.
In addition to these, state constitutions, and in 
particular the State Constitution of the State of Lontana, 
and the Revised Codes of the State of Montana, 1947^ were 
consulted before engaging in the subsequent search for 
specific cases.
The case references cited in this work were largely 
derived from Pacific and Montana Digest^, Montana Reports^^, 
and the Fifth Decennial^^. Naturally, there are citations 
of cases of other jurisdictions than those of the Northwest
1914).
^Ruling Case Law (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., 
2Corpus Juris (American Lawbook Company 192S),
^Corpus Juris Secondum (American Lawbook Co., 1941).
^American Law Reports (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing 
Co., n.d. )•
^American Jurisprudence (Lawyers Cooperative 
Publishing Co., 1943).
6rBlack, 22. cit.. I, 4.
8.
7'Prosser, o£. cit.. I, 4.
Revised Codes of the State of Montana, 1947 
(Annotated) (Allen Smith Company, 1949).
^Pacific and Montana Digest (VJest Publishing Co.,1941) 
^^Montana Reports (State Publishing Co., pub. yrly.). 
l^Fifth Decennial (West Publishing Co., 1948).
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states cited. Wherever the secondary source of authority 
was a reputable one, the abstract was taken from the second­
ary source verbatim, and both secondary and primary sources 
have been cited wherever possible.
Other Sources
The third general source of information, that of 
opinions of lawyers and school administrators, has been of 
assistance in directing the course of research and guiding 
the delimitation of the problem, but has not been used 
directly as reference material or cited as such in this 
paper.
The fourth category, facts gathered from parents and 
pupils, has not been considered as a reliable one, mainly 
because of two factors. The passage of time of course fre­
quently clouds an issue, particularly as to the actual facts 
or sequence of events. Another objection would be the rather 
obvious conclusion that people involved, either as parents of 
injured pupils, or pupils themselves, could not reasonably be 
expected to view their own injury objectively.
The last category, that of hearsay evidence, obvious­
ly has no place in research of any kind. It is merely 
mentioned because such information is frequently offered by 
wellwishers and can "if taken to heart" color the conclusions 
drawn from actual research.
In summary then, it can be said that the last three 
categories of sources were observed, at times appreciated.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
—10—
but seldom if ever used to constitute evidence of the status 
of school liability in Montana or in any other jurisdiction.
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CHAPTER III 
GENERAL BACKGROUND OF SCHOOL LIABILITY
How the Common Law is Applied
The common law, that great mass of court holdings 
and legal principles handed down by courts and judges both 
in England and the United States, has set up certain prin­
ciples of law which are followed by courts in this country, 
in the absence of any statute changing the law.
If a cases arises concerning the tort liability of a 
school district, the court of any state would first examine 
the state laws (statutes) to find out if there was any par­
ticular law on the tort liability of school districts. If, 
upon examination, no statutory provisions are found perti­
nent to the case at hand, the court then examines the cases 
on the same subject which have arisen within the state. The 
legal reasoning, the opinions and the decisions set forth by 
these cases, establish a precedent for any conclusion the 
court draws, assuming the same points of law are involved. 
Suppose, however, the court finds no statutory provisions and 
no cases within its own state on which to rely? The court 
then examines cases from other states having similar laws 
and uses these cases as precedent. There is no law which
-19"
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says any court must follow precedent, but tradition makes 
such practice so common that it is taken to be a probabil­
ity.
When attempting to determine the common law back­
ground or "case law background" in regards to tort liability 
of school districts for pupil injury in Montana, it is nec­
essary to refer to cases from other states. Frequently, in 
matters of law, the Montana courts have looked to California 
decisions because of the similarity between California Codes 
and Montana Codes. This similarity, however, does not apply 
to tort liability of school districts since California has a 
lavr̂  which specifically has changed the common law position, 
while Montana has no such law.
The court of any state then looks first to its ovm 
statutes, next to its own cases, then to the cases of other 
states having similar laws, or no laws superseding the com­
mon law doctrine,
Common Law Doctrines Pertaining 
to School Districts
In an effort to determine what the common law is in 
respect to school districts, it is first necessary to ascer­
tain the relationship existing between the school district 
and the state. Some states have referred to school districts
^California School Code, Section 2, pp. S01-S02.
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as quasi municipal corporations, and public corporations or 
involuntary corporations. Regardless of wording, American 
courts are usually agreed with the sentiments of the Indiana 
court when it defined a school district in the following 
language; "A school district under our system of government 
is merely an agency of the state".^ The courts then are 
agreed that a school district is an agent of the state gov­
ernment, and as an agent of that government, while acting 
within the bounds of its authority, enjoys certain priv­
ileges and immunities along with the state, which have their 
roots deep in the history of common law.
The idea that a state may not be sued without its 
consent is a "hand-me-down" from the ancient medieval maxim 
of "the king can do no wrong", meaning the state of course. 
When this definition of a school district and this common 
law doctrine of immunity of suit are joined, the result 
generally is that a school district may not be held liable 
for the torts of its agent, in the absence of an express 
statute to the contrary. Notice that there are several 
qualifications to this rule of immunity from suit. In the 
United States, this doctrine has not been applied to school 
districts in cases involving contract law, and has been fur­
ther qualified by many courts so that it pertains to immuni­
ty in cases of negligence but not in cases involving active 
misconduct. An inconsistency seems apparent when one
Ipreel v. Crawfordsville, 41 N.E. 312, 142 Ind. 27.
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considers this line of reasoning. First of all, if the 
courts have held that this immunity from suit does not apply 
in cases involving the law of contracts, but that it does 
apply to cases involving negligence, one might well pose the 
question, "Why does the law afford protection to a mature 
individual having a contract with a school board or school 
system for services or goods delivered, in which the only 
probable loss would be of property or money, while the same 
law holds that a small child or his parents may not be af­
forded that protection if they suffer physical injury or even 
death?"
In England, where our "common law" originated, school 
boards are at present liable for their torts^, but American 
courts generally uphold the traditional viewpoint, albeit 
with an increasing number of dissenting opinions and rum­
blings of dissatisfaction^.
There are other grounds upon which the courts base 
this non-liability of school districts for the negligence of 
their employees. The Montana court has outlined in Perkins
3
V. Trask :
Even the school board itself cannot render 
the district liable in tort, for when it commits 
a wrong or tort, it does not in that respect 
represent the district. Various reasons are 
assigned vdiy a school district should not be
^Harold J. Laski, "The Responsibility of the State in 
England", Harvard Law Review, 32;— 1919.
Hamilton, o£. cit.. II, 1$.
^Perkins v. Trask, 95 Mont. 1, 23 P. (2d) 9^2 (1933).
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liable in tort. Some authorities place it 
on the ground that the relation of master and 
servant does not exist; others take the ground 
that the law provides no funds to meet such 
claim. Still other authorities hold that 
school districts in performing the duties re­
quired of them exercise merely a public function 
and agency for the public good, for which they 
receive no private or corporate benefit. Many 
authorities do not base their holding on any 
single ground, but rely on two or more of them 
at the same time.
This decision has been borne out by subsequent cases.^ 
In the above quotation, the Montana court makes reference in 
its mention of a *public function", one of the important 
distinctions made by many courts in determining liability of 
school districts. If in the course of their activities, a 
school board, in its corporate capacity performs what the 
courts consider a governmental function. the general rule of 
immunity applies.
Physical training has been held by the Montana Courts 
as being a governmental function . Other activities which 
courts have declared to be governmental are the maintenance 
or employment of transportation for pupils to and from 
school^, and the charging of the lay public to see an athletic 
event^.
^Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Volk, 74 N.E.
646, (1905); also. Schornack v. School District, 266 N.v;. I4I, 
64 S.D. 215 (I936).
^Bartell v. School District 28, Lake County, 137 P. 
(2d) 422, (1943).
^Poe, op. c_i^., II) 12.
^Rhoades v. School District 9, Roosevelt County,
142 P. (2d) 890, 115 Mont. 352, (1945).
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If on the other hand, the court finds a school district or 
school board, acting in its corporate capacity, has been 
negligent, in the performance of a proprietary or ’private” 
function, the rule of immunity does not apply to the school 
district, and it may be liable as any other corporation. The 
theory is that when such a group as a school board engages in 
a private function not authorized by the state, it has 
exceeded the authority vested in it by the state, and in doing 
so has put itself beyond the protection of the state.
The following cases are representative of the deci­
sions rendered in those states which rely on the common law 
doctrine of immunity, on one ground or another, and have no 
statutory provisions altering it.
In Alabama, the county board of education was held 
not liable for injuries caused to a child by a negligent bus 
driver on the school grounds.^
In Colorado, a case against the school district was 
dismissed on the grounds of district immunity wherein a pu­
pil was injured by a heavy radiator which was standing on a 
sidewalk adjoining the school. Apparently, the pupil, in
the course of play, pulled the radiator over on himself and
2as a result his leg was broken.
^Turk V. County Board of Education of Konroe County, 
131 So. 436, 222 Ala. 177, (1930).
^School district 1 in City and County of Denver et al 
V. jvenney, 236 Pac. 1012, 77 Colo. 429, (1925)•
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A long list of cases could be compiled demonstrating the 
immunity of school districts, but since this paper is con­
cerned with the Montana law, and since the general rule is 
so well established, the noting of a large number of cases 
in detail seems hardly necessary, particularly since the 
Montana cases cited later in this work in detail bear out the 
general rule without exception.
A rather interesting exception has appeared in a few 
jurisdictions relying on the common law in regards to a par­
ticular type of negligence known as nuisance. According to 
Rosenfield^, "A nuisance consists in the existence or crea­
tion of a situation which by its very nature is likely to 
cause injury, harm, or inconvenience to another". A hypo­
thetical example might be a situation in which a school dis­
trict maintained a large open well on the playground, where 
the physical position of the well and the nature of its con­
struction was obviously dangerous to children, and yet by 
virtue of its position children were exposed to it. This 
nuisance doctrine, according to Rosenfield^, was first 
stated by the Michigan court in 1899^, and again in 1937 by 
the Connecticut court^.
^Rosenfield, o£. cit., II, 13, p. 31.
^Ibid.. p. 25.
Ferris v. Board of Education of Detroit, 122 Mich. 
315, 81 h.W. 98, (1899).
^Bush V. City of Norwalk, 122 Conn. 426, 189 At. 608,
(1937).
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Even more recently, in 1951, the Kansas Court^ has 
stated it in the following terms:
A school district, being a quasi public 
corporation, has no more right to create and 
maintain a situation that is a nuisance to 
private individuals than does a municipal cor­
poration.
Rosenfield concluded in 1940 that the states were 
divided on the issue of school district liability under the 
nuisance doctrine. Not only were they divided, but, in his 
opinion, inconsistent frequently within their own jurisdic­
tions as to what was negligence and what was a nuisance.^
Some of the most understandable statements clarifying the 
distinction between negligence and nuisance were rendered 
by Justice Cordozo in McFarlane v, Niagara Falls^, Cordozo 
states, "Narrow is the line between nuisance and negligence". 
In the course of the decision, he points out that the word 
nuisance is a "catchall" term, and that some nuisances are 
based on negligence while others are not. An example of a 
nuisance not based on negligence, according to Cordozo, would 
be the case of the individual whose factory emits noxious 
fumes even though he has taken every precaution to prevent 
it. As an example of a nuisance which has its basis in 
negligence, he cites the situation where a coal hole was
^Neiman v. Common School District No. 95, Butler 
County, 232 P. (2d) 422, 1?1 Kan. 237 (1951).
2Rosenfield, 0£. cit., II, 12.
^McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N.E, 
391, (1909).
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built under proper license but the individual building the 
coal hole was negligent in not having it properly covered, 
hence the situation becomes a nuisance based on negligence. 
Cordozo also points out in this case that: "Whenever a
nuisance has its origin in negligence one may not avoid the 
consequences of his oivn contributory negligence by affixing 
to the wrongdoer the label of a nuisance".
The latter example is probably of more importance to 
school officials, since most situations arising around school 
grounds which would be of a dangerous nature would probably 
tend to fall into the category of cases where the nuisance 
is based upon negligence. This decision is not necessarily 
the law in Montana, but it is significant in that it repre­
sents the legal opinion of a prominent American jurist, 
whose legal reasoning is respected and not infrequently 
followed by the courts throughout the United States,
Liability of School Board 
Members as Individuals
As has been pointed out, the law has clothed school 
districts and school boards, while acting in their official 
capacity, with immunity for their own negligence or for the 
negligence of their employees. However, if a school board 
member, functioning as an individual and not as a part of
that board, is guilty of conduct which the courts deem negli­
gent, he is then liable as any other individual. For example,
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if a school board member were to take some students to a 
football game in his car, and in the course of the trip drove 
his car in a negligent manner which resulted in an accident, 
and some pupils were injured, he would be liable for negli­
gence as would any other individual*
The Indiana courts held the members of a school board 
individually liable wherein the plaintiff, not a pupil, was 
injured by the collapse of poorly constructed bleachers dur­
ing a field day exhibition conducted by the school board.^
The courts held that when the board undertook the construc­
tion of the bleachers the function was not a ’’governmental” 
one in which the board members were engaged but a "minis­
terial” one. This Indiana case is confusing because of its 
inference that a governmental function is opposed to the 
concept of a ministerial function. Usually, the terms minis­
terial or discretionary functions are associated with the law 
concerning municipal corporations, and are applicable to 
school board members as individuals acting as individuals, 
while the terms governmental and proprietary are usually 
associated with the school board as a corporate body. There 
have been no cases as yet in Montana in which a school offi­
cial has been charged with negligence in the performance of a 
ministerial duty, probably because it is difficult to conceive 
of any ministerial duty which a school board member is re­
quired to perform that could lead to pupil injury, A minis­
terial duty has been defined as a specific and positive duty
^Adams v. Schneider, et al, 123 ü.E. 713,(1919).
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required by law^.
Some legal authorities hold that a public official 
regardless of whether his duties are ministerial or dis­
cretionary should be liable if he acts in bad faith.^ 
Although this may be the better view, Montana courts have 
stated it differently.
In 1912, the Montana court made the following state-
3ments regarding the tort liability of public officials.
If the official duty is public no private 
redress is available . . . .
If the act of the official involved discretion 
or is quasi judicial no civil liability attaches 
as long as it is within the scope of the official's 
authority . . . .
Only when official acts are purely ministerial 
is the official liable to individuals for mis­
feasance or non-feasance in the exercise of his 
office . . . .
Poe^ mentions, that many states have statutes which 
specifically exempt members of the board, as individuals, 
from personal liability in cases involving personal injury 
to pupils in public schools. This is no doubt provided by 
some states as a matter of public policy so that responsible
citizens would not be reluctant to accept a position as a
board member, for fear of subjecting themselves to a series 
of lawsuits.
^Montana Law Review. VIII (Law School Association, 
lontana State University, Missoula, ilontana, 1944), P- 97.
2Restatement of the Law of Torts. para. 265.
^Smith V. Zimmer, 45 Mont. 282, 125 Pac. 420, (1912).
^Poe, 0£. cit., II, 12, p. 59.
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It might be pointed out, that the California statute, 
which admits of liability of school board members, qualifies 
itself to the extent that a school board member shall be 
liable if the negligence on the part of the said member is 
the proximate cause of such injury or death^. The court then 
has said, that if a board member’s act is the direct cause of 
the injury, liability exists.
Now the question arises as to the liability of board 
members, as individuals, for the negligence of their employ­
ees, which would include administrators, teachers, janitors, 
and all other employees under contract with the school board. 
There is another doctrine in common law known as respondeat 
superior. This doctrine hinges around the conception of a 
master servant relationship, and that the master should pay 
for the negligent acts of his servant. Most courts have 
held that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply 
to school board member-employee relationships, on the ground 
that administrators, teachers and other employees are not the 
personal employees of the board member , Generally speaking 
then, in most jurisdictions, where there is no statute to 
the contrary, school board members are not liable for the 
negligent acts of their employees, and this is true in the 
State of Montana.
^School Code of the State of California, 0£, cit., 
III, 19, Sec. 2, p. 507.
^Mitchell V, Hartman, 112 Cal, App. 370, 297 Pac. 77,
(1931).
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Liability of Administrators, Teachers, 
and Other Employees
With only one exception^, no doctrine of immunity 
from suit has ever been applied to teachers, administrators 
or employees of school districts. They stand, in the eyes 
of the law, as any other individual, and the only possible 
immunity which they may enjoy may be by virtue of statutory 
provisions relating to corporal punishment. Most states 
have specifically stated in their laws the privileges and 
limitations to v̂ iich a teacher or school administrator is 
subject regarding disciplinary measures and corporal punish­
ment .
The Montana statute regarding corporal punishment is
2typical, and is quoted here in its entirety :
1031. Corporal punishment. V/henever it 
shall be deemed necessary to inflict corporal 
punishment on any student in the public schools, 
such punishment shall be inflicted without un­
due anger and only in the presence of teacher 
and principal if there be one, and then only 
after notice to the parent or guardian; except 
that in cases of open and flagrant defiance of 
the teacher or the authority of the school, 
corporal punishment may be inflicted by the 
teacher or principal without such notice.
While the above law does, in a sense, allow teachers 
^Poe, o£. cit.. II, 12, p. 67.
^School Laws of the State of Montana, 1949 (Tribune 
Printing and Supply Co., Great Falls, Montana, 1949), Chap. 
101, Sec. 1031.
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to commit a technical assault, it is further limited by the 
following section^:
1084. Undue punishment of pupils. Any
teacher who shall maltreat or abuse any pupil
by administering any undue or severe punish­
ment shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and upon conviction thereof before any court 
of competent jurisdiction, shall be fined in 
any sura not exceeding one hundred dollars.
Returning to the general rule, the following cases 
may be of interest to school teachers or principals who are
under any illusions as to whether the doctrine of district
immunity attaches itself to them.
In California, a teacher who permitted pupils to use 
a dilapidated truck which belonged to the school, without 
warning or instruction as to its operation, was held liable 
for negligence when the truck went off the road on a curve 
and injured one of the pupils^.
Another California case, in 1935, involved a high 
school chemistry experiment. During the experiment, students 
were engaged in making explosives. There was an explosion, 
and one of the students was injured. The court held the teach­
er liable, on the ground that such an experiment should have 
been carried on under the strictest attention of the instruc­
tor,^
^Ibid., Chap. 101, Sec. IO84,
2Woodman v. Hemet Union High School District of River- 
side County, 29 P. (2d) 257, 135 Cal, App, 544, (1934).
^liastrangelo v. West Side Union High School District 
of iierced County, 42 P. (2d) 634, (1935),
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In New York, a teacher was held liable for failure 
to properly supervise the playground during noon hour, .*en 
a pupil was injured on a fire escape. Noon hour supervision 
was her delegated job. The facts of the case disclosed that 
she watched the playground through a window which afforded 
no view of the fire escape^.
Another New York case, which should be of interest 
to the physical education instructors, occurred in 1947. In 
this case, a physical education instructor was held liable 
by the courts for letting two boys box, without training in 
self defense or warning of the danger involved. One of the 
boys suffered a hemorrhage as a result of a blow^.
The courts of Iowa at one time provided an exception 
in their interpretation of the common law to the generally 
established principle of non-immunity from suit of teachers^. 
Rosenfield points out, that this attempt on the part of the 
Iowa court4- to extend the immunity of school districts to 
their employees was shortlived, and subsequently changed by 
later opinions of the same court^,
^Miller v. Board of Education, Union Free High School 
District of New York, 50 N.E, (2d) 529, 291 N.Y. 25.
^LaValley v. Stanford, ?0 HYS (2d) 460, (1947).
^Poe, 0£. cit., 11, 12, p. 67.
^Hibbs V. Independent School District, 213 Iowa 341, 
251 N.W. 606, (1933).
Shirkey v. Keokuk County, 225 Iowa 1159, 275 N.V/. 
706, (1938).
5i'.iontanik v. Kcmillin, 225 Iowa 422, 230 N.V/. 603,
(1938).
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The general rule of liability then regarding teachers, 
administrators and employees of school districts is that they 
must conduct themselves in a reasonably prudent manner, or 
answer for the consequences of their negligent acts.
Summary
It has been stated that the common law, as evidenced 
by the opinions of judges and case decisions, has created 
certain broad principles of law which have a profound in­
fluence on cases which might arise in the future. In determin­
ing what the law is, the court looks first to the statutes of 
its own state, next to the decisions of its own courts, and 
then to the decisions of the courts of other states having 
similar laws. These common law doctrines were first discussed 
as they pertained to school districts as a corporate body.
The general rule of common law being that a school district, 
as an agent of the state, is immune from suits for its own 
negligence or the negligence of its employees. Certain excep­
tions to this were pointed out. The distinction, which is 
probably of primary importance to ilontana, being that of 
immunity of the district in the performance of a governmental 
or "public" function, and non-immunity if the activity under 
consideration is of a proprietary or "private" nature.
It has been pointed out, that school board members, 
acting as individuals, in any state not having a statutory 
provision abrogating the common law, are liable for their
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negligent acts. This includes the State of Montana.
The law of tort in regards to teachers, (̂ .vhich term 
generally includes administrators and principals) and janitors, 
is much the same as it is for any private citizen or individ­
ual.
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CHAPTER IV
THE HONIARA POSITION REGARDING 
PUPIL INJURY
Key Montana Cases
In the last twenty six years, the Montana Supreme
Court has had occasion to render four decisions pertaining
to the tort liability of school districts. The four cases
are cited at length in this chapter because they represent
the only cases decided by the Montana Courts regarding the
tort liability of schools.
The first case ivas Mills v. Stewart .̂ The facts of
the case stated briefly as follows, taken from the opinion
of Mr. Justice Holloway %ho delivered the opinion for the
Montana Court, are:
. . . .  George A. Rietz, a resident of Lewis 
and Clark county, was injured while a student 
at the state university at Missoula. He con­
tends that on the day he registered (September 
25, 1923)) he was assigned a room on the second 
floor of the "South Hall" dormitory building; 
that he was not familiar with the surroundings; 
that on the same floor and near ni3 room were 
two doors about two feet apart, one of vdiich 
led into the bathroom and the other into the
(I926).
^Hills V. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332,
- 36-
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elevator shaft; that neither door was 
locked, and neither one was marked or 
labeled, and there was not anything to 
indicate which door led into the bath­
room or which one led into the elevator 
shaft; that the hall v/as dimly lighted, and 
when he undertook to go to the bath-room, 
through mistake he opened the door leading 
into the elevator shaft, and, the shaft being 
unguarded and the elevator above that floor at 
the time, he fell down the shaft to the bottom 
of the pit and sustained serious, permanent 
injuries, on account of which he incurred large 
expenses, only a part of v/hich has been repaid 
to him; a part of such expenses was paid by the 
university.
These matters having been brought to the 
attention of the members of the Nineteenth 
Legislative Assembly, an Act was passed and 
approved (House Bill 39^, Laws of 1925, p. 416), 
which in a preamble sets forth the substance of 
Rietz’ contention. The Act then provides that 
if Rietz presents a claim to the state board of 
examiners within three months after the approval 
of the Act, the board shall hear and determine 
the claim, and if it shall find that the injuries 
were sustained as contended by Rietz, damages 
therefor in such amount, not exceeding $7 ,500, as 
the board shall determine to be just and equitable, 
”shall constitute a legal and valid claim against 
the state of Montana.” The Act then makes an 
appropriation of ÿy7,500, or so much thereof as may 
be necessary to pay the claim, if it is allowed by 
the board.
Rietz made due presentation of his claim, and 
the board appointed a time for hearing; but before 
final action was had this, suit was instituted by 
a resident taxpayer to secure an injunction 
restraining the board from proceeding further 
with the .latter. From an order granting the 
injunction the board appealed.
The complaint in the action proceeds upon the 
theory that House Bill 39^ is unconstitutional, 
and in consequence thereof any action taken by the 
board must be void. This theory was adopted by 
the trial court, and the correctness of it is the
sole question presented by the appeal.
. . . .  The dormitory building is the property 
of the state, and the state is charged with its
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management and control, and, while it does not 
have any moral right to commit a tortious act, 
it has the same capacity to do so as any other 
corporation. (1 Cooley on Torts, p. 208; Bishop 
on Noncontract Law, sec. 749.) The maxim of 
the English law '̂ The King can do no wrong,” does 
not find a place in the jurisprudence of this 
country. (Langford v. United otates, 101 U. 3.
341, 25 L. Ed. 1010.) The state, like any other 
corporation, can act only through agents, and 
if the state of Montana were a private corporation, 
it would be responsible to Rietz in an action at 
law for the damages resulting proximately from 
the negligence of its agent in charge of the dor­
mitory building. But the state is a public 
corporation, and out of considerations of public 
policy the doctrine of respondeat superior does 
not apply to it unless assumed voluntarily'. In 
other words, the state is not liable for the 
negligent acts of its agents unless through the 
legislative department of government it assumes 
such liability.
The main problem in this case then was not of deter­
mining the liability of school districts or of the negli­
gence of the state or its agents, but of specifically deter­
mining the constitutionality of a private bill passed by the 
Montana State Legislature to reimburse the plaintiff.
The case is interesting because of the method used 
to obtain reimbursement for injuries to a pupil, which was 
through the legislature rather than through courts of law. 
This "private bill" method has been employed at various 
times in other states with some success. Nhile the legis­
lature of the State of Montana is not bound by tradition and 
precedent to the extent that courts are, they have certainly 
imposed upon themselves a moral obligation to provide reim­
bursement to pupils injured in the public schools. This 
contention is based upon Justice Holloway’s reasoning in
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declaring that this bill was constitutional because the money 
expended or appropriated for the plaintiff was deemed to be 
for a "public purpose". The public purpose was education in 
this instance. T-Iore of Justice Holloway’s opinion follows;
. . . .  It is elementary that a state cannot 
be sued without its consent or be compelled 
against its will to discharge any obligation.
. . . .  If the term "legal claim" as applied to 
a state has any meaning it must refer to a claim 
vdnich is recognized or authorized by the law of 
the state, or one which might be enforced in an 
action at law if the state were a private corpo­
ration, and this is in the sense in which the 
terra was employed in State ex rel. Mills v, Dixon, 
and apparently it was used in the same sense Tn 
Conlin v. Board.
The question then arises: Was it within the
power of the legislature to give recognition to 
the Rietz claim by assuming a limited liability 
for the negligence, if any, of the state’s agent?
Our legislative assembly acts in virtue of 
inherent authority and not through authority 
delegated to it . . . .  , and since it is not 
prohibited by the state Constitution or by the 
supreme law of the land to assume liability for 
the torts of the state’s agents, it may do so.
In 26 R. C. C. 66, it is said: "The power of the
legislature to make the state or one of its sub­
divisions liable for injuries inflicted by it 
upon an individual is unquestioned even if there 
was no liability at comiûon law."
Reitz has a valid claim against the agent 
through whose negligence he was injured, and if, 
in advance of the injury the state had, by general 
law, assumed liability for the negligence of its 
agents in charge of the university buildings 
there would not be any dissent in the authorities 
from the conclusion that an appropriation to dis­
charge such liability would be for a public purpose.
kVe do not discover any provision of our 
Constitution which forbids the legislature to 
assume liability for injury resulting from the 
negligence of the state’s agent, whether the 
liability is assumed before or after the injury 
occurs, and to say that the state may assume such
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
—Z*.0—
liability but may not discharge it is simply 
to make the law ridiculous.
The Montana court then, in this case, has stated the 
general rule of immunity from suit of the state. The court 
has held that the legislature of the state may assume that 
liability either by an enacting a statute making them liable, 
or by private bill reimbursing a particular individual.
The next Montana case which upholds the general rule 
is that of Perkins v. Trask^. This case is quoted in its 
entirety except for case citations made by the court in its 
opinion.
. . . .  This is an action for damages for the 
death of James Penkake, plaintiff's minor son.
The complaint seeks recovery against school dis­
trict No. 1, of Powell county and against the 
named defendants as trustees and individually, 
and is grounded upon negligence. The trial court 
sustained a general demurrer to the complaint, and, 
deeming the complaint one that could not be 
amended to state a cause of action against any of 
the defendants, entered judgment that plaintiff 
take nothing by her action. The appeal is from 
the judgment.
The sole question presented is whether the 
complaint states facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action against the defendants, or any 
of them. Plaintiff in her complaint, after 
alleging that she is the mother of James H.
Penkake, charges defendants with negligence 
resulting in his death. The particular negli­
gence relied upon is set out in detail, and may 
be summarized as follows: That the defendants
maintained and operated a swiiriraing pool in school 
district No. 1 for the general use of the pupils; 
that, owing to certain facts specifically alleged, 
the pool was a dangerous place in which to permit 
children to play and swim ; that they were permitted 
and directed so to do without having any one in 
charge to guard them; and that in consequence,
Iperkins v. Trask et al, 23 P. (2d) 9^2 (1933).
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while James H. Penkake, then a pupil, was 
playing in the pool, and by reason jf the 
negligence of the defendants, he lost his 
life by drowning.
It is sufficient to say that the allegations 
of negligence are ample to state a cause of 
action if a school district or its trustees, 
either as trustees or individually, may be 
compelled to respond in damages for negligence; 
hence the question is directly presented as to 
whether a school district or its officers are 
liable for negligence.
The general rule, sustained by the over­
whelming weight of authority, is that school 
districts are not liable in damages for injuries 
caused by the negligence of their officers, agents, 
or employees, unless the liability is imposed by 
statute. The courts are not generally in accord 
as to the reason for such nonliability. Some base 
it upon one reason, and some upon another. Th^ 
general rule is stated in 24 R. C. L. p. 6O4 , as 
follows : "The courts very generally hold that
school districts are not liable in damages for 
injuries caused by the negligence of their 
officers, agents or employees, nor for any torts 
whatsoever, unless such liability is imposed by 
statute, either in express terms as is the case 
in some jurisdictions, or by implication, as 
where the district is given authority to levy 
taxes to meet such claims. But of course this 
general rule of law is limited to the district 
itself, and does not extend to independent 
agencies doing work for the district on school 
property. Even the school board itself cannot 
render the district liable in tort, for when it 
commits a wrong or tort, it does not in that 
respect represent the district. Various reasons 
are assigned why a school district should not be 
liable in tort. Some authorities place it on the 
ground that the relation of master and servant does 
not exist; others take the ground that the lav; 
provides no funds to meet such claims. Still other 
authorities hold that school districts in per­
forming the duties required of them, exercise 
merely a public function and agency for the public 
good, for which they receive no private or corporate 
benefit. Many authorities do not base their 
holdings on any single ground, but rely on tvra or 
more of them at the same time.
. . . .  Plaint iff»s counsel contend that this
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case is not controlled by the rule announced 
by the great weight of authority for several 
reasons:
First. It is argued that, because of 
section 1022, Revised Codes of 1921, which 
provides that "every school district constituted 
and formed as provided in this title shall be and 
is hereby declared to be a body corporate, and 
under its own proper name or number as such 
corporate body may sue and be sued, contract and 
be contracted with, and may acquire, purchase, 
and hold and use personal or real property for 
school purposes mentioned in this title, and sell 
and dispose of the same," there is legislative 
authority to sue a school district in tort. The 
adjudicated cases hold that such a statute does 
not have this effect........
Second. Plaintiff's counsel contend that 
under the laws of this state defendants had no 
authority to construct or maintain a swimming 
pool, and hence cannot defend on the ground that 
they were but performing governmental functions.
Our Constitution imposes the duty upon the 
Legislative Assembly "to establish and maintain 
a general, uniform and thorough system of public, 
free, common schools." Section 1, art. 11. This 
the Legislature has done by the enactment of our 
school laws. The courses of study are prescribed 
by section 1054, Revised Codes of 1921, with 
power in the boards of trustees "to determine 
what branches, if any, in addition to those re­
quired by law, shall be taught in any school in 
the district." Chapter 122, Laws 1923, and 
chapter 122, Laws 1931. Also by chapter 1A7,
Laws 1927, the trustees are given authority to 
issue bonds for the purpose of constructing or 
acquiring a gymnasium and for "furnishing and 
equipping the saii.e." (Section 1.) Under the 
broad rules announced in ilcNair v. School District 
87 .'lont. 423, 288 P. 188, 69 A.L.R. 866, the 
trustees have authority to construct and maintain 
a swiroraing pool for the use of the pupils.
It is also contended by plaintiff that, if 
there be authority to maintain a swimming pool, 
the authority does not extend to the right to 
maintain a dangerous instrumentality, such as the 
one is alleged to be in this case, and that in 
consequence there is no immunity from liabilitv on 
the ground that its maintenance constituted a part
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of the governmental functions of the school 
district. This contention overlooks the fact 
that in all cases holding that there is no 
liability on the part of the district or its 
officers for negligence there is no statutory 
authority for the maintenance of the offending 
agency in a negligent manner.
It is also contended that, if the board has 
the right to maintain a swimming pool, its right 
is optional and not mandatory, and hence the rule 
of immunity does not apply. This fact does not 
alter the legal principle applicable. Krueger v. 
Board of Education, supra.
Other contentions made by counsel for 
plaintiff as to the liability of the school 
district and the trustees, as such, have been 
considered by us, and we see no reason for de­
parting from the rule sustained by the overwhelming 
weight of authority.
The only remaining question is: Are the
individual defendants personally liable? . . . .
But in most of the cited cases the injury or 
damage was caused by the failure to perform a 
statutory duty. Here there is no statute 
directing how a swimming pool shall be maintained.
The complaint does not charge a failure to 
perform a statutory duty. The other cases deal 
with ministerial, as distinguished from govern­
mental, duties, and hence are not controlling here.
Perkins v. Trask then has summed up the various 
grounds upon v^ich the general rule of immunity applies. It 
has also declared that the existence of a statute in Montana 
stating that a school district may sue and be sued does not 
alter the common law position as regards to tort liability. 
The court pointed out the distinction between government and 
proprietary functions and relies heavily on this line of 
reasoning as the basis for school board immunity. It also 
infers that school board members might be liable for neg­
ligent performance of a ministerial duty, and that they would
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be liable for negligent conduct if engaged in a proprietary 
function.
The next case is Bartell v. School District ho, 23, 
L^ke C o u n t y The facts of the case and the opinion as
stated in the words of the court are as follows :
. . . .  The complaint is for damages for 
negligence. It alleged in part that plaintiff 
was a pupil and defendant Bronson the principal 
of the school mentioned; that Bronson, within 
the scope of his employment as such and while 
coaching and instructing several older boys of 
the school in the field event of shot putting, 
directed plaintiff to stand near where the heavy 
iron shot would fall and to mark the place; that
Bronson, without warning to plaintiff, cast the
shot, striking plaintiff on the head and 
inflicting serious injuries of a permanent nature.
. . . .  In accordance with the well established 
rule * it has been held by this court in Perkins v. 
Trask, 95 Mont. 1, 23 P. 2d 9^2, that school dis­
tricts are not in general liable for injuries 
caused by negligence of their officers, agents 
or employees unless liability is imposed by 
statute ; even though the activity with which the 
negligence is connected is optional with the 
school district.
Plaintiff’s contention is set forth as follows 
in his brief: "We do concede that the general
rule is that a school district is not liable in 
tort, but this case falls within the list or line 
of exceptions. The rule is that a school district, 
town or city as well as a county, is not liable 
for tort when the tort is committed while acting 
in a governmental capacity.
"The rule laid down in the case of Perkins v. 
Trask - * has no application and is not controlling 
in the case at bar, nor do the many citations 
mentioned therein throw any light on this case.
The facts and conditions are materially different.
In the Trask case there was inaction while per­
forming a governmental function in the absence of
^Bartell v. Bchool District No. 23, Lake County, 137 
P. (2d) 422, (1943).
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specific statutory instruction. Here there is 
positive action, in fact an overt act, placing 
a child in a dangerous place vdiile he was not a 
part of the athletic team, when by force of rule 
and authority he had to obey, failing to advise 
him of the accompanying danger, and failure to 
warn him whenthe professor threw the ball, and, 
we claim, in violation of a statute which requires 
a cautious lookout for the welfare of a child, and 
in the presence of statutes giving the school 
board power to levy taxes for athletic purposes.
And no one can, with any degree of credence, say 
these acts as above listed are governmental functions,
"If this boy had been part of the athletic 
team and chose to perform the duties he did 
perform of his oivn volition or even by request 
and then was injured, we concede there would be 
no liability and, under those circumstances, the 
rule of the Trask case would apply."
W a i le plaintiff states that there are various 
exceptions to the rule of non-liability, the 
exceptions upon vdnich he relies here are shown by 
the distinction he draws between the circumstances 
of the Trask case and the instance one. The 
contention seems to be that because plaintiff was 
not voluntarily receiving instructions as a 
member of the athletic team (1) the defendant 
school district was not acting in a governmental 
function and (2) the injury resulted from 
plaintiff’s being put into a dangerous place by 
"positive action, in fact an overt act" rather 
than by mere negligence or non-action. That these 
are the only grounds upon which he relies is sho\‘jn 
by his final admission quoted above. He speaks 
also in this reference to "a statute vAiich requires 
a cautious lookout for the welfare of a child" and 
"statutes giving the school board power to levy 
taxes for athletic purposes." whatever the school 
district’s duties and powers lay be in those 
respects are not shovn to be any different under 
the circumstances of this case from what they were 
in the Trask case, in which the accident occurred 
in connection with a swimming pool instead of an 
athletic field.
It does not appear how, in the athletic 
activity in question here, the district was 
acting in any less a governmental function than 
in the Trask case. It is unquestioned that 
physical training is part of the educational duty 
entrusted to the public schools, i.chair v. School
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District Ko. 1, S? Mont. 423, 2SÛ P. 183,
69 A.L.R. 866, V/e find no authority for the 
proposition that these educational duties are 
limited to the members of voluntary athletic 
teams, and can imagine no serious argument 
which could be made to that effect. Plaintiff’s 
reference to that phase of the matter in the 
final sentence quoted above from his brief must 
therefore have been intended to relate to the 
proposition that he was there by positive order 
of the principal rather than by his own volition 
and that the proximate cause of the accident va.s 
therefore the principal’s affirmative action 
rather than his mere negligence. It will not be 
necessary to consider '/vhether the order placing 
him in that position was the proximate cause of 
the injury.
For the proposition that the district is 
liable if the injury is caused by an affirm­
ative action rather than by mere negligence of 
its employees, plaintiff relies only upon the 
following statement from 24 R.C.L. 605, Sec, 6O;
"The authorities generally recognize that this 
rule of exemption from responsibility, as broadly 
stated, does not extend to positive mischief 
produced by active misconduct, or direct acts in 
the nature of a trespass which invade the premises 
of another to his injury,"
Obviously there is great difference between 
the "affirmative act" of the principal in asking 
plaintiff to mark the place where the shot was t'̂ 
fall and the "active misconduct" referred to in 
the textbook statement. The only case cited by 
Ruling Case Law is Daniels v. Board of Education,
191 Mich. 339, I5Ô N.W. 23, L.R.A.1916P, 468, from 
which the statement vra.s quoted; but that case merely 
held that under its facts there was no liability, 
so that it can hardly be considered a precedent 
for either of the propositions stated. The court 
cited as an authority only an earlier Michigan 
case relating to the second proposition, that of 
trespass upon another’s premises, and not to the 
first proposition of "active misconduct." The 
rule further more, in so far as it may be good, 
apparently relates to action by the district 
authorities and not to the unauthorized actions 
of its mere employees or agents.
Thus the rules are stated (56 C.J. 530, lection 
622) that a district is not liable for the negligence 
of its officers, agents or employees except where
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made so by statute, and (56 C.J. $26, Section 
621) that the district is not liable for its 
ovmi negligence in the absence of statute, except 
under some circumstances "for a trespass upon 
private property committed in the improper exer­
cise of its lawful functions." It will be 
noted that no such exception is stated in connection 
with the question of a district's liability for 
negligence of its officers, agents or employees 
as distinct from its own negligence.
It is our conclusion that the present case 
is not within any exception to the general rule.
'Æether that rule should be changed, as has been 
done with reference to certain circumstances by 
the legislatures of California, Washington,
Oregon and other states, is a matter for the 
legislature rather than the courts.
Again the Montana Court has made the distinction of
governmental versus proprietary function, and defined physical
training as constituting a governmental function of the
school district. It has pointed out that there may be some
exception to the general rule for trespass committed in
improper exercise of lawful functions, but the opinion
rendered in the Trask case was upheld.
The next case, that of Rhoades v. School District
No, is important for again the governmental - proprietary
distinction is relied on, but more important perhaps because
of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Erickson, The
majority opinion of the court was delivered by the Honorable
Frank P, helper, which is as follows:
. . . .  Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries 
alleged to have been suffered by her as a result 
of an accident which occurred in the school 
gymnasium at Poplar, Montana. The defendants,
iRhoades v. School District Mo, 9, 142 P, (2d) 690,
115 Mont. 352, (1943).
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appeared by general demurrers which were 
sustained. Plaintiff was granted time in which 
to file an amended complaint. Having failed to 
plead further, plaintiff’s default was entered 
and judgment of dismissal followed. This 
appeal is from that judgment.
The sole question presented is —  Does the 
complaint state facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action against the school district 
or against the other defendants as trustees or 
against them as individuals or against any of 
them? All of the allegations of the complaint, 
which are well pleaded, stand admitted. We 
therefore have these admitted facts:
That the defendant district is one of the 
duly constituted school districts of Roosevelt 
County, Ilontana, The other defendants are the 
duly elected, qualified, and acting trustees of 
that district.
The building in which the accident occurred 
is a school gymnasium. It was constructed and 
is maintained by this school district and is 
upon school grounds.
At the time alleged in the complaint there 
was a basket ball game or contest between the 
neighboring school teams of Brockton and Poplar. 
The general public in that vicinity were advised 
of the time and place of this game through 
advertisements. Plaintiff attended that contest. 
She paid admission.
Within the gymnasium is a floor space suitable 
for playing the game of basket ball and other 
games. Within the gymnasium and above the space 
provided for playing basket ball is a gallery for 
the accommodation of spectators. Leading to 
that gallery is a stairway. As the plaintiff 
approached the gallery by way of this stairway 
one of the stairs collapsed or gave way and 
she received the injuries complained of. She 
alleges the construction was faulty and that the 
stairway was not properly maintained.
So far as material, these are the essential 
admitted facts.
It must be conceded that the allegations of 
negligence contained in the complaint are 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action if
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the school district or its board of trustees, 
either as such or individually, are liable in 
damages for negligence.
This court has heretofore passed upon this 
precise question in the case of Perkins v. Trask, 
95 I-iont. 1, 23 Pac. (2d) 9#2, 953, and there used 
the following language:
"The general rule, sustained by the over­
whelming weight of authority, i s ........'»
. . . .  Counsel for plaintiff concede that 
the foregoing is the general rule but contend that 
this court, as well as other courts, have mod­
ified the rule in that a distinction has been 
drawn between a governmental instrumentality such 
as a county, city or school district when acting 
in a governmental capacity as distinguished from 
a proprietary capacity; and that, in the instant 
case, the school district and its officers were 
acting in the latter capacity; that is, in a 
proprietary as distinguished from a governmental 
capacity. In support of that contention counsel 
cite a number of adjudicated cases, among which 
are . . . .
In none of these cases, or in any of the 
others to which the court's attention has been 
called, is there any modification of the rule that 
no liability attaches v^ere the instrumentality 
such as a county, city, or a school district is 
acting solely in a governmental capacity. A 
careful analysis of the allegations of the 
complaint here compels the conclusion that the 
defendants were acting in this instance in that 
capacity— that is, in a governmental capacity,
A public school system is provided for in our 
Constitution (section 1, Article XI). The trustees 
of a school district may issue bonds for the 
purpose of constructing a gymnasium (Chapter 147, 
Laws of 1927, sec. 1224.1, Rev. Codes of 1935).
The evolution of our common school system is 
most interesting and that system has contributed 
no little to the development and stability of 
this nation, v.'e have come to regard education—  
not as a development of a part of the faculties, 
but of all of them— the intellectual, the moral, 
as well as the physical, (î t. Herman Boys' School 
V. Gill, 145 mass. 139, 146, 13 H.E. 354, 3 5 7 7 1 In 
order to make effective our conclusions in that
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respect we have authorized the proper officers 
of a school district to expend our ;r.oney in 
the construction of a gymnasium, A part of 
that physical training consists in the playing 
of games— basket ball among others. Because 
some are better able to coordinate the action 
of the different members of the body, they are 
more adept at playing games than are others ; but 
with basket ball, as in all other games, practice 
makes perfect.
It is a matter of common knowledge that, in 
these schools, teams are selected to play against 
another team or teams of the same school; and 
that out of all of these are selected those who 
have acquired the greatest proficiency, and these 
compose the team which represents the school in 
contests with teams from other schools in the 
same general vicinity. In striving to make the 
first team there is a great rivalry, A spirit of 
emulation is developed— all of which results in a 
more complete development of uhe physical powers, 
Undoubtedly, one of the elements which stimulate 
the contestants is that they will be afforded an 
opportunity of exhibiting their skill in games 
against their fellows of the same school or 
against teams of a different school. This, we 
think, is true, not alone as it pertains to 
physical sports, but the same may be said of 
debating teams, or of band concerts, or of 
exhibitions of the art department of a school.
The fact that a band concert is held, or an 
exhibition of the work of those in the art 
department of the school had, brings better results 
in each of these departments. Therefore, we 
conclude that the basket ball game in question 
was merely a part of the program of physical 
education of the school; and consequently, the 
defendants were exercising governmental functions 
in connection therewith.
Counsel for plaintiff emphasize the fact that 
an admission fee was charged and assert that because 
such charge was made, the activity is removed from 
the field of governmental functions. With that we 
cannot agree. Little if any difference does it 
make whether the admission fee thus collected 
went into the school fund, or whether the expense 
of conducting this game of basket ball was paid 
from general taxation. The result is the same. It 
advances the purpose of physical education. That 
is a part of the governmental functions of the 
school district and of its trustees........
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I'le reaffirm the rule announced in the case 
of Perkins v. Trask, supra,
Neither are the members of the board 
individually liable; this for the reasons set 
forth in the Perkins case,
The dissenting opinion on the above case of Justice 
Erickson is important to luontana, because it represents the 
first dissent on the Supreme Court as to Wiat constitutes a 
governmental or proprietary function, and may v̂ ell be indic­
ative of some future decision. It will be noticed, th;t the 
case does not involve injury to a pupil. It is quoted here 
because of its obvious importance to school people. Follow­
ing is the dissenting opinion of Justice Erickson:
. . . .  I dissent. As is indicated in the 
quotation from Perkins v. Trask, 95 Ilont. 1,
23 Pac. (2d) 932, found in the majority opinion, 
the reason for the rule exempting school districts 
from tort liability is not generally agreed upon 
by the authorities. The rule arose, of course, 
from the old idea that the king could do no 
wrong, and suit would not lie against the sov­
ereign, The courts of this land have never agreed 
on any single basis why, in the absence of statute, 
recovery against the school district cannot be had 
by reason of its tort. One state (California) has 
entirely discarded the old rule. (See, also,
Kelly V. Board of Education, 191 App. Div. 251,
180 N. I. Supp. 796.) Most of the states, in 
attempting to decrease the severity of the rule, 
have adopted the governmental-proprietary test.
This test is an arbitrary one, but the general 
trend of the decisions is to declare more and more 
functions proprietary rather than governmental so 
as to allow recovery. It is now generally agreed 
that neither logic nor justice supports the general 
rule which in this case denies recovery to the 
person injured where she goes for entertainment to 
a basket ball game sponsored by a school district, 
while on the other hand for exactly the same injurv
under the same conditions she could recover if she 
had gone to a theatre and had been there injured.
For a general discussion of the governmental- 
proprietarv test as applied to municipal corporations
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in the light of recent decisions, see the 
article in 22yij>ginia Law Review, 910, and 
also the article in $4 Harvard Law Review,
437.
This court has in its recent decisions 
followed the trend of the majority of the courts 
of this country by applying the governmental- 
proprietary test liberally so as to permit re­
covery. The gist of the majority’s opinion in 
this case is that the activity here in question 
was so closely connected with the historically 
recognized governmental function of the school 
district that it partook of the same nature.
It seems to me that in the Jacoby case cited in 
the majority opinion, (Jacoby v. Chouteau County, 
112 Mont. 70, 112 Pac. (2d) 1068), and certainly 
in the Johnson v. City of Billings case, 101 
Mont. 462, 54 Pac. (&a) 579» the activity out of 
which the tort arose was as closely identified 
with the governmental function, if not more so, 
than the holding of the public contest which we 
have in this case. I cannot reconcile the 
decision in this case with the decisions of those 
two cases, particularly the more recent one of 
Jacoby v. Chouteau County, supra.
Rehearing denied November 26, 1943*
Implications to School Districts
The Montana cases cited in this chapter have borne 
out the general rule that school districts, in their corpo­
rate capacity, are not liable for their own negligence or 
for the negligence of their employees. They have inferred, 
however, that while this general rule of immunity will apply 
to cases involving a governmental function, it will not 
apply if the school district, or the school board, engages 
in a proprietary function. Justice Erickson’s dissenting 
opinion, quoted above, shows an increasing willingness on 
the uart of ohe court to consider more functions as being
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proprietary in nature.
These cases have also inferred that a school board, 
or a school board member, may be liable for negligent per­
formance of a ministerial duty. The implications of these 
cases should demonstrate to school board members in this 
state that while the general rule of immunity is upheld in 
Montana, and has been upheld in every one of these cases, 
the opinions are in many instances not favored by the courts 
as being entirely just, and that the doctrine of immunity 
generally rests upon the court's willingness to follow pre­
cedent in an effort to let the legislature assume responsi­
bility for enacting remedial legislation.
There has been no legislative action forthcoming on 
this subject. However, the trend in legislation in some 
other states has been to allow suits against the district to 
a limited extent; these statutory exceptions are discussed 
in more detail in Chapter V. One may well wonder what the 
effect might be if injured parties, instead of seeking re­
covery through the courts, were to attempt in any great num­
ber to bring their influence to bear upon the legislature in 
the form of requests for private bills. Certainly the legis­
lature is morally obligated to pass these bills, and the 
court, if it were to follow precedent, would be obligated to 
declare these bills constitutional because of the decision in 
Mills V. Stewart.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-54-
Implications for Teachers,
Administrators and 
Employees
The absence of any litigation involving teachers for 
pupil injury in this state is probably explainable on the 
ground that due to the average school teacher's income sat­
isfaction of any judgment might be difficult. Montana 
Courts, however, have stated rather clearly in Mills v. 
Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332, if the plaintiff's in­
juries were the result of negligence on the part of the per­
son responsible for the care and management of the dormitory 
building, the plaintiff would have a valid legal claim which 
he might enforce in an action at law.
This line of reasoning would seem to be quite ap­
plicable to any case which might arise involving the neg­
ligence of a school administrator, or teacher in charge of 
a dormitory, or a janitor in charge of school buildings.
In view of the fact that teachers' salaries, and 
school employees' salaries in general have been increasing, 
and in view of the fact that the Montana court to date has 
not allowed satisfaction against the district, (unless re­
medial legislation is passed by the state legislature) school 
people might reasonably expect to be sued more frequently 
in the future than in the past. The question arises as to 
what is expected of a teacher or administrator by way of
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supervision. The Perkins v. Trask case was not against a 
board, so the question was never clearly decided as to wheth­
er failure to supervise a swimming pool constituted negli­
gence on the part of a teacher, however, the wording of the 
court infers that it did. The Montana court would undoubted­
ly have to look to other jurisdictions.
It is obvious, however, that a duty exists to provide 
some sort of supervision over pupils in school or on the 
playground^.
The most frequently occurring type of case concerns 
accidents which have happened in the course of physical 
training activities.
A football coach, for example, is protected to some 
extent from injuries that might happen to one of his players 
in the course of a game by virtue of the fact that there is 
an assumption of risk there, also by virtue of the fact that 
it is customary in this state for schools to require pupils 
engaged in competitive athletics to take out insurance on 
their own behalf. The implications of the common law, how­
ever are quite clear that this assumption of risk does not 
apply to activities engaged in in a regular physical educa­
tion class or "gym period".
The case of the New York teacher who allowed the boys 
to box, mthout warning or instruction, stands as a warning 
to physical education instructors. As a general rule an
ll60 A.L.R. 127-196.
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instructor in physical education may be liable if he requires 
the performance of any activity on the part of a pupil which 
results in an injury to that pupil, if the injury was a for- 
seeable result of the activity. In brief, he has no right 
to require the performance of a task which is beyond the ob­
vious physical capacity of the pupil.
As to the liability of administrators for physical 
education facilities, it may be generally stated that many 
states hold them responsible for the inspection of such fa­
cilities, to the extent that no obviously dangerous condi­
tions exist, Rosenfield^ cites a case which may be of par­
ticular interest to over-zealous football coaches. The case 
concerned a football coach >ho knowingly sent an injured 
player back into the game. He was declared negligent for 
doing so and held liable, and moreover, the court declared, 
that if he did not know of the injury, he was negligent be­
cause of his ignorance of it.
The next area in which there appears to be a con­
siderable amount of litigation concerning pupil injury is 
that of transportation. School bus drivers in the State of 
ilontana are required by law to be bonded, if they are under 
an individual contract with the school district. Districts 
operating their own busses are required to carry personal
liability insurance on the driver of between ten and fifteen
2thousand dollars .
iRosenfield, 0£. cit.. II, 13, p. 64.
^School Laws of Montana, Chapt. 152, Sec. 6.
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There have been a number of cases in other juris­
dictions brought against school bus drivers. The general 
conclusions drawn from these cases are that a bus driver's 
duty of care towards the children on his bus does not end 
vdien the student steps away from the bus, particularly if 
the students have to cross a highway in front of the bus or 
behind the bus. Failure on the part of the bus driver to 
warn small children of the danger, has been held to be suffi­
cient cause to hold a bus driver liable for negligence^.
Another type of activity which is worth considering, 
particularly since the activity type of curriculum is gain­
ing in popularity, is that of the duty and liability imposed 
upon teachers and administrators in the course of undertaking 
field trips or excursions with students,
Madaline Remralein^ points out in her article that in 
the course of visiting industrial plants, students have been 
declared to be mere licensees, and must accept the premises 
as they find them. There appears to be no duty on the part 
of the owner to make the plant or premises safe. She also 
points out that while no cases have been brought against 
teachers to date (1941), the courts have said it was the 
teacher's responsibility for taking pupils to a dangerous 
place,
^Rosenfield, o^, cit,, II, 13, p. 77,
^Hadaline Remmlein, "Excursions are Often Hazardous", 
Ration's Schools, XXVII (may, 1941), 55.
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Another situation which frequently arises in the 
public schools, is that instance in which a teacher finds 
himself or herself in the predicament of having to render 
first aid, and is under an obligation to do so. This does 
not mean that a teacher has the authority to exercise med­
ical judgment in the treatment of injuries or disease, 
except in the case of emergency. It is somewhat alarming to 
note also, that if in the case of an emergency the teacher 
fails to do anything, she may be liable criminally as well 
as civilly.
An example of the limitations on first aid treatment 
are illustrated by the case of the teacher who was held 
liable vdien she put a boy's infected hand in a pan of scald­
ing water for ten minutes, the results of which should be 
obvious^.
Summary
In summary, it is found that the Ilontana courts have 
adopted the traditional common law conception of school 
immunity, and that they are more and more inclined to rest 
this doctrine upon the grounds of governmental versus pro­
prietary functions. They conclude, with one dissenting 
opinion in the latest case, that a school district is not 
liable for its ovm negligence or the negligence of its em­
ployees.
^"Accidents to Pupils, National Education Association 
Research Bulletin, XXV (1940), 32»
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Aithough there have been no cases brought against 
board members as individuals in this state, the general 
weight of authority is that they may be liable as individuals 
the same as any teacher or administrator, but that the occa­
sion for a board member to be acting in such a capacity in
respect to pupils would be rare.
Teachers, administrators and other employees of 
school districts are regarded in the same general category 
as other individuals, but may enjoy certain limited privi­
leges in respect to disciplinary measures. It may be added,
that the courts, as a matter of public policy, are sometimes
reluctant to declare a teacher negligent because of the very 
nature of educational work, which entails a heavy obligation 
to expose oneself to situations fraught with possibilities 
for injuries to small children.
There is nothing in the dicta of the Montana cases, 
however, to reassure teachers that the Montana court would 
view a teacher's negligence or an administrator's negligence 
in failing to provide inspection or supervision as being 
unique or an exception to the general rules of tort liability.
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CHAPTER V
COMPARISON OF THE MONTANA POSITION 
REGARDING LIABILITY AITH 
OTHER STATES
It has already been stated that the majority of the 
states of the union have followed the common law rule in re­
gards to tort immunity. Only seven states have enacted any 
form of legislation to change the common law regarding tort 
immunity^. These states are: California, Washington, Oregon,
Minnesota, New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.
The California law expressly permits suits against 
the district for the negligence of the officers or employees^.
In the State of Washington, immunity from suit has 
been voided by a law. The permission is limited, however, 
in that the statute expressly forbids suits based on in­
juries connected with parks, playgrounds, field houses, 
athletic apparatus or appliances, or manual training equip­
ment^ .
^National Education Research Bulletin, o£. cit., IV, 
54, aAV (1943).
^California School Code, 0£. cit., III, 26.
^Redfield v. School District, 92 Pac. 770 (1907).
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Minnesota passed a law in 1873 which was supposed to 
allow suits against school districts for the negligence of 
their employees; however, a subsequent decision of a Minnesota 
court held that the statute applied only to damages to prop­
erty caused by a breach of duty by school officers, and did 
not change the rule of immunity^.
Oregon has had a similar experience to that of 
Minnesota, in having the teeth taken out of the law by judi­
cial interpretation^.
The next interesting type of statute which has been 
effective in reducing the harshness of the governmental 
immunity rule has been the so called save harmless statutes 
found in Connecticut, New York and New Jersey^.
In this type of statutory provision, the law states 
that school funds may and will be used to reimburse teach­
ers v^o are sued because of their negligence in the course 
of their duties. New York has qualified its statute to the 
extent that it "saves harmless" from liability teachers and 
administrators only in districts of less than one million 
population, and in larger districts it apparently protects 
all employees.
^3ank v. Brainer School District 51, 51 N.. 814
(1892).
^Antin vs. Union High School District No. 2, 280 Pac.
664, (1929).
^Cumulative Supplement to Connecticut Statues, 234h-
New York Education Law, Sec. 569a.
New Jersey Statutes Annotated. Sec. 18:5-50.2.
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Frequently in the school laws of various states are 
found provisions that require the drivers of school busses 
to carry liability insurance, or if the bus is under contract, 
liability insurance must be carried by the district. Montana 
has such a provision in its school laws^.
Another method frequently employed by socially minded 
school districts throughout the United States has been the 
taking out of liability insurance to protect the district in 
case of pupil injury. The legality of this insurance has
been questioned in many states, and has been rejected by the
2courts of West Virginia and North Carolina . The Montana 
Attorney General, Arnold H. Olsen, rendered an opinion in 1951 
on this subject to the effect that; "School district boards 
of trustees have no authority to expend school district funds 
to contract for liability insurance"^.
There is some valid criticism of this method for, if 
the common law doctrine of immunity were applied, it would 
be very easy for an insurance company to claim that there is 
no need for it to pay since no liability exists in the eyes 
of the law.
Many insurance policies of this nature have had the
ISchool Laws of Montana, 1949, Chap. 152, Sec. 6.
^Rosenfield, 0£. cit., p. 124. 
o
Montana Attorney General* s Soinions, aAIV (October 
19, 1951), Opinion No. 43.
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specific clause written in them that the insurance company 
will not raise governmental immunity as a defense.
The overall picture of school district liability may 
be summed up by saying that the only states which have at 
present conceded, by legislation or judicial interpretation, 
the changing of the common law doctrine, have been California 
and Washington. In the remaining forty-six states, the common 
law doctrine still applies, but the severity of it has been 
lessened in Connecticut, New York and New Jersey. Minnesota 
and Oregon have attempted by legislation to change this rule, 
but subsequent judicial interpretations have practically 
nullified the effect of their laws. As it stands at the 
present time, California is the only state where governmental 
immunity has been removed to the extent that a pupil or his 
parents may recover from the school district with the same 
ease they could recover from a private corporation.
New York has accomplished this by the "save harmless" 
statute, but has not actually declared that the common law 
rule does not exist.
One thing may be noted with respect to the Montana 
judicial decisions concerning this subject, Montana decisions 
have been consistent, and they have relied, along with the 
majority of states, on the common law rule. They have de­
clared that the statute to sue and be sued does not affect a 
school district, and would probably decide that the provision 
in the school law requiring bus drivers for school districts 
to carry liability insurance would not in any v/ay be admissive
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of liability on the part of Montana school districts.
The general trend throughout the United States has 
been to lessen the severity of the common law rule. This has 
been done by a variety of methods, most of which have been 
discussed in this chapter. One of the methods has been the 
use of specific statutory provisions that school districts 
are liable. Another method discussed, has been the so called 
save harmless statutes. Another method not discussed here, 
because of its use in the State of Washington, has been 
practically nullified by subsequent decisions of the 
Washington court, are the safe place statutes. Along with 
this general trend, it should be noted that the Federal 
Government itself has now consented by statute to allow it­
self to be sued in tort^.
With reference to teachers and employees, the sit­
uation is universally similar, the only exception being the
2brief Iowa experiment .
It should be added, that Washington, Mew York and 
California, during the last ten years, have all had an ex­
ceedingly large amount of litigation concerning injuries to 
pupils. In view of the fact that these are heavily popu­
lated states, it is difficult to make inferences from the 
number of cases found; however, one might conjecture that it 
is possible these states, in their effort to provide a just 
remedy to the public, have subjected themselves to a
^Federal Tort Claims Act, 1943. 
^Supra, p. 30.
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tremexidous expense in having to provide funds to satisfy 
judgments and damage suits, or reimburse teachers who are 
sued.
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CHAPTER VI 
SUM-ÎARY AND CONCLUSION
The problem has been defined as that of ascertaining 
the status of liability on the part of Montana school dis­
tricts and employees for the injury of pupils. It can be 
said that Montana is a typical state in its legal decisions 
on this matter. For many years, the courts of various states 
have voiced their disapproval of the common law doctrine of 
district immunity. Regardless of wording, however, few courts 
have ever taken it upon themselves to change the common law 
by judicial interpretation.
Some judges have reasoned that since the common law 
"grew up" in the courts, and was evolved by the judicial 
branch, it is not only the perogative but the obligation of 
the courts to change the law.
Regardless of the dicta of cases, however, the courts 
in general have steadfastly adhered to the doctrine of immu­
nity.
In two states, they went so far with their decisions 
as to practically nullify the effect of a statute which was 
probably intended to abrogate the old common law rule.
The problem of school district immunity has been dis­
cussed at great length in comparison to the time devoted to
- 66-
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employee liability, because the ability to reimburse an in­
jured pupil or his parents must generally come from a larger 
bank account than is possessed by most public school employees.
Strong legal and moral arguments may be presented for 
upholding this doctrine of immunity from suit. First of all, 
as a matter of sound public policy, it might be considered 
better to hold those liable whose negligence was personally 
the cause of an injury. Secondly, is it a justifiable expen­
diture of public funds or taxpayers’ money to reimburse one 
particular member of that public? Thirdly, would the abro­
gation of this rule bring a multitude of so called "smart 
money” suits against the public treasury?
The arguments against holding the district immune 
from suit for the torts of its agents are both academic and 
practical. On the academic side, it may be said that any 
line of legal reasoning which has as its basis a phraese- 
ology (the king can do no wrong) reminiscent of the divine 
right of kings, has no place in a republican form of govern­
ment which has dedicated itself to democratic philosophies.
It could be further argued, that if the federal government 
now allows itself to be sued, by what moral or logical rea­
son does the state government continue to hide behind its 
immunity.
The law has drawn a fine distinction between those 
obligations arising out of the law of contracts and those 
arising from injury to the person or property. It is dif­
ficult to understand or appreciate the social worth of a
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reasoning process which says in effect that the rights of 
businessmen shall be held sacred, but the rights of a small 
child, if he is injured in the course of attending a public 
school, (which the government insists he attend for the better 
part of his childhood) are held to be subject and limited by 
a rule which evolved long before the funds of a state were 
ever considered public funds.
It has been pointed out that a great many cases have 
been brought against school districts, teachers, administrators, 
and school employees in the last few years. In those states 
where the school district is liable for its own torts and the 
torts of its agents, it has caused, without a doubt, a size­
able expenditure of public funds.
There are several aspects of the situation which can­
not be measured in financial terras. Of primary consideration, 
is the matter of public relations, A lawsuit brought against 
the district or a teacher is probably one of the most detri­
mental occurrences which can befall a school system or an 
individual associating with tnat system. If the school dis­
trict hides behind its immunity, it leaves the teacher to 
pay, if the teacher cannot pay and no judgment can be obtained, 
hard feelings arise on the part of the injured party or his 
parents. On the other hand, if either the school district or 
one of its teachers are found negligent by a court and held 
liable for negligence, such publicity may be used by those 
in any community, who wish to see a change in school adminis­
tration or the board, as an affidavit testifying to the "poor
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job” the school is supposedly doing.
When these two factors, financial cost and detri­
mental publicity, are coupled with the moral issue, that of 
the right of a young child or its parents to be reimbursed 
for injuries suffered due to the negligence of someone else, 
the primary consideration as it pertains to school people 
should be, "How can we best avoid those situations which 
could lead not to liability necessarily, but injury or harm 
to the pupil?"
Progressive educators are advocating more and more 
the "experience curriculum". If this philosophy of educa­
tional method continues or grows in popularity, by its very 
nature, it will expose students of all ages to out-of-class 
activities, activities which by their very nature would 
expose a person to a greater risk of harm than the heretofore 
prosaic life associated with the traditional classroom.
This work has not attempted to list specific situa­
tions in which a school board member or employee is or is 
not liable for negligence. No two situations are probably 
exactly alike, and it is frequently a matter for the jury, 
rather than the law to decide whether a person or a corpora­
tion acted in a negligent manner. It has attempted to render 
a general background in the field as to the reasoning engaged 
in by courts of law in applying the law of torts to school 
districts and their employees.
A school board member in ilontana should be aware 
that while he is generally immune from suit, as a member of
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that body, for the negligence of the administrator or teacher, 
it is extremely bad politics to have a suit brought against 
a board. Secondly, that this immunity applies only if the 
activity engaged in by the school board is of a governmental 
nature. It does not apply if the activity being engaged in 
is of a proprietary nature, or one in ^hich the board itself 
would realize a profit or gain. One further word of caution 
should be noted, in that this rule of immunity does not, 
nor has it ever, applied to a member of a school board acting 
as an individual and not as a corporate member of that board.
To administrators, the problem has its political con­
notations similar to those of a board member. In addition 
to this, courts and juries have consistently supported the 
view that a duty to supervise and correct known dangerous 
conditions is an obligation inherent to the position.
To teachers, a study of this type should indicate 
that regardless of phrases such as "district immunity", no 
such immunity applies to them, and that to avoid situations 
in which they may become liable, they must utilize, in the 
course of their daily work, a great deal of common sense 
tempered by the knowledge that the law and the public expect 
prudent behavior commensurate with their position.
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